

UDC 165.62

**ON THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF M. HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF WESTERN METAPHYSICS**

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Philosophical ideas that are connected with the existential and irrational context of the modern world are becoming relevant again, because in the modern world, the world of digital technologies, artificial intelligence, political and other conflicts, people are faced with uncertainty, socio-political instability and the loss of traditional value structures.

The relationship between existential and irrational tendencies in ontology, social philosophy, and philosophy of law can offer a new perspective on issues such as individual freedom, social responsibility, and the role of the state. Modern society faces various crises, both political and economic, which raises the question of the need to rethink classical ideas and concepts. The spread of new technologies and changes in the socio-cultural sphere lead to the emergence of new forms of social relations and individual practices that require philosophical analysis. Times of global challenges such as climate change, pandemics and international conflicts show the need to understand human nature and the mechanisms of social organization not only within the framework of positivism, rationalism or vulgar rationalism.

In this phenomenological context, Heidegger already in the first half of the twentieth century came out with a critique of scientific rationality as the most susceptible to technological influence. Modern reception allows us to say that we can consider Heidegger's philosophical position as a critique of science. If we understand Heidegger as a philosopher who proposed, in the Hegelian style, a rejection of the reductionism of modern science, then this assumption is quite justified. After all, M. Heidegger already in the late 20s of the twentieth century actively discussed the nature of science with Cassirer. And Heidegger's main argument boiled down to the fact that all neo-Kantians, like Cassirer, rely on and appeal to authorities (the opinion of authorities) in scientific knowledge: "What else remains of philosophy if the totality of things has been divided into sciences? What remains is simply knowledge of science, and not knowledge of the essence" [1]. This statement by Heidegger accurately reflects the logic of his critique of scientific thinking: thus, the sciences divide the spheres of the universe among themselves, and each science addresses exclusively those entities that appear within its domain, and understands these entities in accordance with the parameters of the rational instruments that it has at its disposal. These entities must be displayed in accordance with the directions and parameters of the specific sciences that study them, and these entities will manifest themselves as objects of study: for example, objects of physics, objects of biology, objects of chemistry, etc. As a result, the method of modern natural science turns all phenomena of the surrounding world into objects of science and offers us revelations, calculations and statements about these phenomena, confirmed in accordance with the boundaries of science. At the same time, each science regulates the area to which the phenomenon belongs. Thus, "science sees the world scientifically," and Heidegger argues that this method of revealing the natural world conceals unscientific ways in which the world could appear to us, ways that could represent a more authentic encounter with the world.

Obviously, in modern philosophical discourse, Heidegger's criticism boils down to the fact that there is a methodological formalism of neo-Kantian theories of science, which is expressed in the unconditional dominance of natural science: "natural science consists in the mathematical design of nature" [2]. The methods of modern science reduce our understanding of phenomena in the world to ideal, quantifiable modalities, and this leaves philosophy with no other goal than to provide a theoretical basis for scientific knowledge. Heidegger, in his critique of the rationalism of such a science, is convinced that rationalism

distracts philosophy from revealing more genuine relationships with the world, in contrast to the mathematical methodologies of the reductionist approach.

According to Heidegger, it is necessary to reconsider the foundations of modern epistemology, which at the current stage only provides support for the formal-methodological foundations of natural science, but should be precisely an ontology, that is, study the nature of being itself [3].

Heidegger believed that Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" does not present an epistemology of natural science, but a metaphysics that attempts to unravel the appearance of objects. The problematic of ontology to which Heidegger refers here is the problem of appearance itself: "is the appearance of objects simply a fact that we state, or should the whole problem of reason be conceived in such a way that we understand from the outset how appearance necessarily belongs to the nature of human beings?" [4].

When Heidegger speaks of grasping "from the very beginning," he means that we must understand how objects came into being, from the beginning of philosophy to the present. As we have seen with the emergence of man in the history of biology, objects appear to us according to their historical situation, and this situation includes the privileged methodologies of human understanding at that time. Leaving aside the precision of Heidegger's exposition of Kant's aim in the Critique of Pure Reason, we see a striking similarity between Heidegger's exposition of Kant's ideas and a textual fragment of Hegel's that Heidegger includes twice in his much later work, Hegel's Concept of Experience: "But science, in appearing, is itself an appearance" [5].

Modern science governs how objects and ideas appear to us, but modern science itself is an object and an idea. Yet objects and ideas emerge in history and evolve according to the same cultural changes that apply to all human innovations.

Philosophers had long sought grounds for objective truth, so neo-Kantians found Heidegger's criticism strange and accused him of relativism. And like Hegel, Heidegger accused the natural sciences of trying to separate themselves from history and not recognize any authority other than their own methodology. Heidegger was convinced that natural science positions itself as the main instrument of knowledge, an instrument using transcendental epistemology. This meant for Heidegger that the natural sciences are not capable of independently determining the validity of all truth claims. Following Hegel's logic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Heidegger portrays science as a phenomenon in history and therefore the object of the scrutiny it hopes to avoid: historical criticism. Scientific reasoning is itself part of the historical dialectic. It is not a value-neutral tool for understanding reality, but it is also itself an object of study in ontology, which we might now define more precisely as the study of the semblance of existence.

Heidegger sees in Kant's attempt to develop "das Problem des Scheins" [6] (the problem of appearances, which can also be interpreted as the problem of illusions) a quasi-Hegelian approach to ontology that not only participates in the dialectic of philosophy, but also considers the appearance of objects and their truth as part of a grand historical description.

The neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant proposes an ahistorical epistemology that solves the problem of how objects come into being so that they can be studied according to the standards of research specific to each scientific discipline. By ignoring the historical connection to the concrete situation, the logic of the natural sciences resorts to self-deception: it imagines itself to be something it is not. This self-deception manifests itself in scientific empiricism. This is Heidegger's conclusion [7].

Scientific reasoning asserts ahistorical certainty on the basis of its empirical verification, but the logical structure of a hypothesis (or experiment, or any observation) still places the idea first (hypothesis) and last (conclusion). The "hypothesis or experiment" structure of scientific reasoning places the idea above nature, so that the natural objective world serves as confirmation or refutation of the hypothesis. The observation-inference structure reconfigures the experimental event according to the parameters of human observation, which themselves are quite naturally determined by the historical conditions in which the observation takes place. Thus, not only is the scientific method unable to overcome its historical connection with the situation, it imitates Platonic idealism, in which nature is judged by the degree to which it participates in the idea. Heidegger concludes that antique idealism is embedded in the methodology of modern scientific reasoning, an idealism that its empiricism was designed to avoid. Despite its empirical credentials, modern science begins and ends with the idea. As such, it maintains a subjective metaphysics of representation: the natural world appears to science as an idea or representation [8].

Heidegger argues that the special validity (evidence) claimed by scientific reasoning is ultimately based on the appearance of objects in nature. Scientific rationality remains indifferent to the charge of idealism, affirming the absolute certainty of objective reality: that the methodology of science allows objects to appear as they really are, and therefore transcends historical prejudices. Natural science can thus afford to

ignore Kant's metaphysical problem of existence, which poses the question of why objects appear as they really are.

In "Being and Time", Heidegger points out that objects appear in two ways: present as objects of observation or study, and ready for use, as objects in use. That an object can appear in different ways speaks volumes about our personal and historical relationship to them. This is the problem with the world, that objects do not simply appear in an "objective" or "true" form, but that instead objectivity itself is a mode of appearance. Heidegger suggests that the appearance of objects has been a central problem in philosophy since pre-Socratic philosophy, and that this problem persists in antique and medieval thought. It was the scientific revolution and Cartesian philosophy that led us to ignore the problem of things [9].

By affirming a transcendental ego and a transcendental object, natural science creates a subjective metaphysics of representation in which truth is expressed as the correspondence between the propositional representation of an independent object and the independent object itself, without explaining how the correspondence between two dissimilar things expresses the truth of the natural world. Reaffirming Kant's "Problem of Being", Heidegger reminds us of Hegel's conclusion that science, by ignoring the appearance of the Absolute, most flagrantly violates the very requirement of certainty to which it claims to conform. Heidegger suggests that every revelation involves a concealment [10]. Thus, the process by which we come to understand nature always conceals something in it, but there are more or less authentic ways of being in the world that include different forms of what is concealed. The reductionist approach of modern scientific reasoning corresponds to the pragmatic worldview that Heidegger calls "technological thinking".

In summary, M. Heidegger comes to the final conclusion that science is the "metaphysics of modernity". And Heidegger's logic is as follows: under the influence of technological thinking, reductionist science appropriates the world to serve technology. Thus, humanity is no longer open to nature and is not surprised by it. What is happening to us? What is happening is that we, humans, perceive the natural world as a world that is in our reserve, the world is now perceived as a resource for some purpose.

"The metaphysics of modernity," according to M. Heidegger, reduces human existence to its utilitarian parameters. And in this sense, Heidegger's phenomenological critique can be understood as a critique of scientism. In this regard, Heidegger wrote that "science looks at the world scientifically," and thereby argues that this method of revealing the natural world (offered by science) conceals non-scientific ways in which the world could appear to us, ways that could represent a more authentic encounter with the world".

Heidegger later argued that the "natural scientific justification" is timeless, a phenomenal something existing in itself, immersed in a concrete historical moment and therefore has no right to claim not to be evaluated as such. Moreover, "the reductionist approach of modern scientific reasoning makes it well suited to the utilitarian worldview".

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