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MODERN TECHNOLOGIES FOR MANIPULATING THE PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF CITIZENS OF KAZAKHSTAN

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Political manipulation is part of the political system to achieve strategic goals. Political public relations (PR) is the most common and invisible form of manipulation. While the term is familiar to many, few know that it is a mechanism used to manipulate perceptions. PR is most often defined as "white PR" or "black PR" [1].

White PR focuses on promoting the positive qualities of a politician or event to maintain a good public image. An excellent example is what Gennady Shipovskikh, a current member of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, has achieved. He actively participates in the social network TikTok, the audience of which extends from children to the elderly [2]. His choice of platform and the type of content he shares strongly influences what people think of him. Through TikTok, he shares news about his work, addresses specific social issues, and even participates in family-oriented activities with his daughters. This makes him both a dedicated public servant and a devoted family man. G. Shipovskikh's popularity is also supported by his knowledge of the Kazakh language, despite being Russian. This can be seen as a move to draw attention to deliberately emphasize traits that voters like. In this way, white PR succeeds by emphasizing strength and creating a benevolent image.

Black PR, more often than not, is aimed at damaging the reputation of political opponents. It involves spreading unfavorable news, which can be either accurate, fabricated or exaggerated. The aim is to undermine public confidence and reduce voter support. Take, for example, the case of Azamat Amirtai, former chairman of the "Baytak" party. Two years ago there was sensational news that he had violated a number of rules and caused maximum damage. In a short period of time, the party "Baytak" held an urgent meeting, at which A. Amirtai was removed from the position of chairman. This announcement triggered a negative reaction from the public. Most of the public took it negatively, calling him a hypocrite and questioning his integrity. In fact, it was a gigantic black PR campaign that caused immense damage to his public image. Later, Azamathan Amirtai officially responded to the issue by categorically denying the allegations and calling the whole story nothing more than a well-planned black PR campaign. This is a clear example of how such manipulative tactics can sway public opinion and tarnish the reputation of even well-known political figures. In the long term, such campaigns can have a lasting impact on the credibility of an opponent, reducing the likelihood of his or her equal competition in the political arena. One of the most common ways of manipulating the consciousness of the masses is the use of mass media. Information transmitted through television, radio and other publicly available mass media channels unambiguously shapes the attitude of citizens to current events. For example, during the January 2022 events in Kazakhstan, the media covered scenes of destruction of urban infrastructure, vandalism by civilians, burning of houses, looting and popular unrest. While such media coverage in no way directly misrepresented the facts, it shifted the focus from the initially peaceful nature of the protests to the extremist aspects. The graphic depiction of bloody incidents served to justify the declaration of a state of emergency, the deployment of security and peacekeeping forces, and the imposition of curfews. The emotional impact of such messages contributed to increased levels of fear and anxiety among the population. Parents concerned about the welfare of their children discouraged them from participating in protests, while young people themselves, interpreting events in the context of media depictions of violence, may have concluded that the non-violent nature of protest was completely lost. Thus, the media have been actively involved in shaping public opinion, rationalizing coercive policies and limiting the field of political activity.

Currently, manipulation of public consciousness through the Internet and social networks is emphasized. Various Internet sites and social networks are used as powerful tools for shaping public opinion in political processes. During election campaigns, users' news feeds are overflowing with election-related content: videos, images and election bloggers' comments that discuss and emphasize the importance of the upcoming elections. The main goal of this strategy is to mobilize the electorate by completely focusing the information space around the election issue and thus provoking public debate and

participation at the polling stations. As foreign scholars note: "These processes are directly related to the use of big data technologies and algorithms to provide individualized content. With the help of such mechanisms, users purposefully gain access to only selected information, and thus, the phenomenon of "information bubble" arises, or a scenario in which algorithms create a closed media space reflecting only the immediate interests and tastes of the user. Thus, people are confronted with a distorted version of reality to the exclusion of other options and view the sponsored narrative as the only correct interpretation" [3].

For example, we can consider online publications on the parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan in 2023. In Kazakhstan, the majority of citizens read news through online media such as Tengrinews or Zakon.kz, while another significant part of the population watches state TV channels. Both sources of information focus on the so-called "central party" during elections. "Central party" is an interchangeable term referring to the ruling political force, most often one that occupies an authoritarian or tutelary position in the system. In Kazakhstan, this role is played by the Amanat party, and it has consistently garnered 70 percent of the vote. Thus, election coverage is mainly centered around the Amanat party, with much less attention paid to each political party. This creates an information bubble in which most citizens come to believe that Amanat is the only qualified, credible and the only "right" choice, leaving very little room for criticism of other parties. In contrast, urban discussion forums and online media pay more attention to independent candidates. Their audiences tend to react in a similar way, interested in alternatives to the ruling party, i.e. that independent voices could offer a more promising direction. But these audiences are also represented in their own media environment and are unlikely to compare the actual election programs of different candidates. As a consequence of manipulative technologies, information dependence can emerge, which manifests itself in the fact that people regularly rely on a few sources while neglecting others. For example, if people watch only mainstream media channels, their world is described by the way these channels present information - either downplaying some issues or even exaggerating them [4]. This dependency is also reversed when people believe unreliable sources. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, some segments of the population were misled by dubious Internet sources spreading conspiracy rumors about "microchipping" and other fictitious dangers. With the exception of credible sources refuting such misinformation, many people refused vaccination and ultimately opposed public health initiatives.

One way to reduce the impact of manipulation on public consciousness, in our view, is to transform value orientations. Therefore, one of the positive long-term consequences of information influence is a gradual shift in national and traditional values. For example, for Kazakh society such important national values are peace and interethnic harmony, security, family values, as well as the development of the Kazakh language as an element of national identity.

However, today, it is no secret that due to the efforts of some bloggers, public campaigns (e.g. feminist movements) and the propaganda of certain lifestyles on social media, Western norms and cultural patterns are becoming more widespread. This leads to a shift in focus from traditional cultural and family values to other value systems, leading to conflicts between groups with opposing worldviews. Here we can agree with the opinion that "polarization of values increases intergroup tension, reduces the level of social harmony and forms the basis for further fragmentation of society" [5]. Similar strong representation can be seen in the public sphere through the activities of high-profile individuals. For example, the well-known blogger Róza Coach is an open supporter of feminist values among her followers and has been massively criticized by right-wing commentators. This polarization became particularly evident on March 8, 2022, when Almaty hosted the first officially approved feminist march by the city administration. It was organized by feminist groups such as Feminita and KazFem, and featured activists advocating for women's rights, criminalization of domestic violence, equal wages, and protection from discrimination. Activists marched with placards such as "Feminism will save Kazakhstan," "My body is my choice," and "Let's crush the patriarchy." The reaction of conservative and traditional sectors of society was swift and negative. Some political and public figures openly condemned the march. For example, parliamentarian Kazybek Isa called it "devilishness," saying that the event undermined the national mentality and cultural code. State and conservative media equally claimed that feminism posed a danger to the institution of the family and traditional national values. This scandal reflects a deep public split on gender issues in Kazakhstan. The debate went far beyond the streets, spilling over into social networking websites and chat forums. Opponents often criticized feminists for imposing an "alien" Western agenda and ignoring indigenous traditions, but their defenders stressed that they must fight structural inequalities and institutionalized biases.

The conflict over language within Kazakhstan is also worth noting. One of the long-term consequences of information flows in contemporary Kazakhstan is the change in value orientations over time. In practice, however, the media environment is creating new tensions. As social media, civic action campaigns and global propaganda of Western norms and lifestyles gain momentum, competing value systems are revealed. This process has led to polarization: dominant family and community norms are increasingly being challenged by modern attitudes, often Western-influenced. Thus, subgroups of society form opposing views of the world, destroying consensus and contributing to fragmentation. A clear indication of the confrontation can be seen in the emergence of so-called "language patrols". For example, in March 2021, the bloggers mentioned above, such as Kuat Akhmetov (author of the online party Til Maidani) and Dias Kuzairov, began visiting stores, cafes and government offices armed with cameras, demanding service in Kazakh. Their behavior, presented as a call for legal guarantees to provide services in the state language, was widely publicized on TikTok and YouTube. But the public outcry soon turned into a scandal. The authorities condemned such campaigns as "professional provocation" and "primitive nationalism" and opened criminal cases. K. Akhmetov went into exile, although the charges were later dropped, and D. Kuzirov was forced to remove his video and apologize publicly. There is no unambiguous public opinion on this issue. For example, a public figure such as Galym Ageleuov argued that such cases could be resolved through education and dialog rather than criminal investigations [6]. This example demonstrates how language functions not simply as a means of communication, but as a symbol of identity deeply embedded in competing value systems. On the one hand, the popularization of the Kazakh language is widely seen as a basis for strengthening national identity. On the other hand, hostile campaigns can lead to a deterioration of inter-ethnic harmony, which itself remains a pillar of Kazakhstan's fundamental

values. The controversy over "language patrols" thus highlights a broader problem: how to balance the need to preserve national identity with ensuring social cohesion among an increasingly diverse and polarized population.

Consequently, political manipulation is a very convenient tool with a wide range of choices, but also with enormous social risks. Its use requires a balance between strategic objectives and the trust of citizens. Otherwise, the consequences can lead to chaos and the collapse of society.

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РЕАЛИЗАЦИЯ ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ В СОДЕРЖАНИИ ШКОЛЬНЫХ УЧЕБНИКОВ ПО ИСТОРИИ

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Тема гражданского образования у академика Е. А. Букетова представляет собой целостную концепцию, включающую понимание того, как формируется гражданин через университет, научную школу, культуру труда и ответственность перед страной. Гражданственность не отделена от академической этики и профессионального мастерства: университет выращивает не только специалиста, но и ответственного участника общественной жизни; научная школа – не только «станок» подготовки кадров, но и нравственное сообщество; технологическая модернизация – форма «разумного патриотизма», понимаемого как служение общему благу. Эти линии прослеживаются в ряде его работ исторической и гражданской направленности, таких как «Грани творчества» (1977), «Шесть писем другу» (1989), «Святое дело Чокана» (1985).

Букетов прямо связывает университет с воспитанием «широкого кругозора», то есть с преодолением предметной замкнутости. Он формулирует практическую «конституцию» университетского гражданского образования: «Я считаю необходимым коснуться еще одной стороны деятельности университета – воспитания специалистов с широким кругозором... В университетах наименьшая опасность замыкания в своей специальности... историк или филолог в идеале должен иметь ясное представление и о достижениях современной физики, и об основах генетики» [1, с. 67].

Это не декларация, а рабочее требование к учебному плану и воспитательной среде: универсальное образование расширяет горизонт ответственности выпускника, снижает риск технократизма и гуманитарной слепоты. Концепт объединяет знание и гражданскую ответственность: тот, кто видит связи науки и культуры, легче распознает общественные последствия своих решений (пример – этические аспекты энергетики, экологии, биомедицины).

Еще один кирпич гражданского образования – устойчивая «школа» как среда, где нормы поведения и ответственность перед коллективом и обществом передаются вместе с методикой исследования. «Научные школы... не рождаются по взмаху волшебной палочки. Это процесс сложный, длительный, предполагающий наличие квалифицированного профессорско-преподавательского состава с крупными талантливыми учеными в его ядре» [1, с. 74]. Это не только структура подготовки кадров, но и институт гражданской социализации, предполагающий самоограничение, взаимную требовательность, приоритет дела над карьерной атрибутикой.

У академика Букетова гражданское воспитание начинается не с обучающегося, а с примера наставника: публичная скромность, приоритет содержания над формой, труд на перспективу. Его знаменитая формула – готовая «этическая памятка» для молодых ученых : «Побудьте по возможности, в тени, много печатайтесь, становитесь не по титулам... а по сути ваших научных достижений» [2, с. 97]. Это утверждение ничуть не «морализм»: в позднесоветском контексте оно звучало как защита академической свободы от бюрократии званий и «кадровиков». В публицистике, посвященной Е.А. Букетову, подчеркивается, что столь принципиальная позиция имела и персональную цену, но именно она задавала норму гражданской автономии ученого.

Евней Арстанович делает эпистемологически точное наблюдение: без «большой суммы» устойчивых знаний прорыв невозможен. Это – методологическое ядро его гражданской программы: культурно «узкий» специалист не только менее продуктивен, но даже может быть опасен для общества. «Ни у одного ученого не может